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Philosophers, and not just philosophers of mind, commonly speak of 
the “content” of a mental state. If one is comfortable talking in this 
manner, then a natural question to ask is what kind of content a mental 
state might have, and whether, in particular, mental states like belief 
have the same or a similar kind of content as an experience. My question 
here concerns whether Kant claims that experience has nonconceptual 
content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual.1 
1 Note that my usage of the term “experience” here and throughout is not meant to correspond to 
Kant’s technical term Erfahrung but rather to his notion of an intuition. For discussion of how 
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For Kant scholars, figuring out how Kant might have answered this 
question has been one of central importance. Part of the reason for this 
stems from the relevance of Kant’s account of intuition to three central 
and enduring issues of philosophical interest, namely, our acquisition 
of empirical concepts, the fixation of basic perceptual belief and the 
epistemic warrant we attain for such beliefs.2 However, as I shall discuss 
below, there is a sense in which this debate concerning the content of 
intuition is ill-conceived. Part of this has to do with the terms in which 
the debate is set, and part to do with confusion over the connection 
between Kant’s own views and contemporary concerns in epistemology 
and the philosophy of mind.
However, I think much of the substance of the debate concerning 
Kant’s views on the content of experience can be salvaged by reframing 
it in terms of a debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist 
between different cognitive capacities. Below, in Sect. 8.2, I clarify the 
notion of “content” I take to be at stake in the interpretative debate.3 
Sect. 8.3 presents reasons for thinking that intuition cannot have con-
tent in the relevant sense. I then argue, in Sect. 8.4, that the debate 
be reframed in terms of dependence. We should distinguish between 
Intellectualism, according to which all objective representation (under-
stood in a particular way) depends on acts of synthesis by the intellect, 
and Sensibilism, according to which at least some forms of objective 
representation are independent of any such acts (or the capacity for 
such acts). Finally, in Sect. 8.5, I further elucidate the cognitive role 
of intuition. I articulate a challenge which Kant understands alethic 
modal considerations to present for achieving cognition, and argue that 
a version of Sensibilism that construes intuition as a form of acquain-
tance is better positioned to answer this challenge than Intellectualism.
2 Examples of work which most clearly attempt to address these issues in both contemporary phi-
losophy and the study of Kant include Lewis (1929), McDowell (1996), Sellars (1968) and 
Strawson (1966).
3 In this chapter, I do not pretend to give a comprehensive survey of positions or arguments. I aim 
instead at discussion of some central issues. For a more thorough attempt to chronicle the extent of 
the debate, see McLear (2014b); cf. Grüne (2009).
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8.2  What Is Content?
Contemporary philosophy typically construes the phrase “mental content” 
as referring to that thing which fulfils a certain functional role—namely, 
it is that (i) which may be the object of different cognitive states within 
the same subject (e.g. of belief and desire), (ii) which may be the object 
of the same (or a different) cognitive state in other subjects (e.g. that you 
and I might be able to believe the same thing and thus communicate), 
and (iii) which has veridicality conditions (e.g. that which you and I both 
believe is true).4
So typically, when we ask about the content of a mental state, we are 
asking about something which is supposed to fulfil these three roles. The 
traditional satisfier for this functional specification is an abstract entity—
a proposition.5 For example, I might both hope that there is snow on Mt 
Washington and desire that there is snow on Mt Washington. You and I may 
both believe that there is snow on Mt Washington. And the contents of our 
beliefs may well be true.
This notion of content also requires a conception of the thing which 
has content, namely, the “vehicle”.6 One example of a vehicle is a sen-
tence. The English sentence “snow is white” expresses the proposition 
that snow is white. There is a set of corresponding English phonemes that 
4 As it turns out, these conditions are partly constitutive of our notion of conceptual content. 
Whether there are other kinds of mental content has been an issue of some controversy. For rele-
vant discussion, see Beck (2012), Heck (2009) and Peacocke (1992). As I argue below, while it is 
plausible to think that Kant admits a notion of “content” in this sense, it is doubtful that he allows 
for any other kind of content. This does not, however, mean that conceptualism is correct.
5 For some historical context for this view, see King et al. (2014), Chaps. 1–3. Once propositions 
are admitted, much of the debate about nonconceptual content can be transposed into a debate 
about the constitution and structure of propositions. For representative discussion, see Heck 
(2009) and Stalnaker (1998). I examine Kant’s conception of propositional content below.
6 The fact that there is a difference between vehicle and content does not mean, however, that the 
two are unconnected. For example, a mental state might inherit its content from features of the 
vehicle. If one admits the existence of sense-data, then one might take their representational prop-
erties (or some subset thereof ) as inherited from features of the sense-data—e.g. a red sense-datum 
represents the property red in virtue of the sense-datum’s instantiating that very property. In the end 
though, what I am concerned with here is specifically the content and not the vehicle. When Kant 
is careful he makes similar distinctions. See e.g. his discussion of sensation (Empfindung) and feel-
ing (Gefühl) in the Third Critique (KU, 5:189, 203–6). It is therefore no resolution of our question 
to say that Kant admits the existence of nonconceptual vehicles (such as feelings).
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when uttered together also express the relevant proposition. Finally, we 
might also postulate a mental vehicle (i.e. the psychological state or event) 
for content, such as the thought (an occurrent psychological state) that 
snow is white.7
So in asking whether Kant accepted the (possible) existence of 
nonconceptually contentful mental states, we first need to know whether 
it is even coherent to ascribe to him a notion of “content”, conceptual or 
not (and irrespective of whether he would use the corresponding German 
word Inhalt for this notion), in the terms set out above.
It seems highly plausible that Kant did accept the existence of con-
tent as specified. This is his notion of a “judgement” (Urteil). The vehi-
cles for judgement are mental states, “representations” (Vorstellungen). 
Judgements are the product of “relating” representations, in the act of 
judging, in one consciousness:
The unification of representations in a consciousness is judgment. … Thinking 
is the same as judging or as relating representations to judgments in general. 
(Prol, §22, 4:304; cf. Log, §17, 9:101; V-Lo/Wiener, 24:928)
What kinds of representation are related in one consciousness? 
Kant specifically has concepts in mind (cf. KU, 5:287; B146, B283; 
Log, 9:101; V-Lo/Wiener, 24:928). Judgements consist of concepts 
that, due to an act of the mind in which they are unified in one con-
sciousness, are brought together to form truth-bearing contents via the 
process of synthesis (I leave open how exactly Kant thinks this is accom-
plished, but it must involve appeal to his notion of a “transcendental 
unity of apperception”). But what is grasped in the judgemental act—
the judgement proper—is not itself something merely psychological 
(B142; Prol, 4:298–9; cf. Anderson 2001). This is why Kant can say of 
logic—the study of concepts, judgements and inference—that it “has 
no empirical principles, thus it draws nothing from psychology …, 
which therefore has no influence at all on the canon of the understand-
ing” (A54/B78).
7 I leave open here what this mental vehicle is. It could be a neural state type, or something at a 
higher and more abstract level of specification.
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In addition to serving as the content of psychological vehicles and the 
bearers of truth, Kant also considers judgements to be the objects of dif-
ferent epistemic attitudes. For example, he distinguishes between variet-
ies of “holding for true” or “assent” (Fürwahrhalten) in the Canon of Pure 
Reason at the end of the First Critique :
Assent [Das Fürwahrhalten] is an occurrence in our understanding that 
may rest upon objective grounds, but that also requires subjective causes 
[Ursachen] in the mind of him who judges. (A820/B848; trans. amended 
and emphasis added)
Kant then identifies three different kinds of assent with respect to 
judgement, namely, opining, believing and knowing, as well as a kind 
of defective form of assent that he terms “persuasion” (for discussion 
see Chignell 2007). Depending on one’s evidence or “ground” (Grund) 
for assent (A822/B850), one might at one time opine what at a later 
time one knows. Hence, Kant seems to acknowledge the existence of 
content in the relevant sense. There is something—judgement—that is 
carried or expressed by psychological states, which can be the object of 
different epistemic attitudes, and which is the bearer of truth and falsity. 
Furthermore, since judgements are constituted by concepts, Kant obvi-
ously accepts that at least some mental states—acts of judging—have 
conceptual content.
However, one might object that Kant does not conceive of the con-
tent of an intuition or a judgement in the way that I have suggested. 
For example, Clinton Tolley (2013, 2014) has argued that Kant’s use of 
“content” (Inhalt) concerns not our contemporary notion of a proposi-
tion, specified above, but rather something else. For example, there are 
a number of texts where Kant connects both the content of cognition 
(B79; B83; B87) and that of intuition (B67; cf. Tolley 2014:207) with a 
“relation to an object”. Kant also partly defines intuitions and concepts in 
terms of how they relate, immediately or mediately, to objects (B93). I 
want to raise two points concerning Tolley’s discussion.
First, based on Kant’s use of “content” there is a short argument to 
the conclusion that intuitions do not have conceptual content (Tolley 
2013:128):
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 1. The content of a cognition (whether intuition or concept) consists in, 
that is, is nothing but, a relation to an object.
 2. Concepts and intuitions relate to objects in different ways, that is, 
mediately and immediately.
 3. The content of intuition is different from the content of concepts, that 
is, it is nonconceptual.
This argument gives us good reason to reject the idea that intuition 
could have, in Kant’s sense of the term, a concept as its “content” (Inhalt).8 
Indeed, Kant’s notion of content does not obviously fit with the concep-
tion of content that I have been working with thus far.
Second, Tolley’s analysis of Kant’s use of “content” might nevertheless 
be compatible with the contemporary notion that I have been working 
with thus far. The basic idea would be that the kind of relation to an 
object, which constitutes Kant’s use of “content”, is itself determined by 
the kind of correctness condition, and thus “content” in our contempo-
rary sense, of the relevant psychological state. In an empirical judgement 
we have a specification of some logically possible state of affairs. For Kant, 
thought is directed to its object by means of a condition which an object 
or state of affairs may or may not satisfy. As long as something satisfies it, 
whatever it is, then the judgement is true. In this sense a judgement only 
mediately relates to an object. It relates to it mediately because it specifies 
a general condition, which any number of possible objects might meet. 
Thus, one can have a particular object in mind only to the extent that that 
object satisfies the specification which is the content of one’s thought.
If mediate relation to an object is understood in terms of a kind of 
content that specifies a condition that may or may not be satisfied, imme-
diate relation to an object might similarly be understood in terms of a 
different kind of content, one that is singular rather than satisfactional, 
and thus could only refer to a specific thing. Singular content is not con-
tent that specifies a condition. Instead the relevant object is part of the 
content itself (I leave open how best to interpret “part of” here). On this 
way of thinking, then, the mediate/immediate relation that Kant speaks 
8 For opposing views see e.g. Engstrom (2006), Griffith (2012) and Willaschek (1997).
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of is best understood in terms of a difference between descriptive (i.e. 
satisfactional) and singular content.9
Although this attempt at a rapprochement between the two senses of 
“content” (Kant’s and our own) is attractive, I think it cannot ultimately 
work. The problem, as I discuss in the next section, is that, although Kant 
obviously accepts that intuitive representations have relation to an object, 
he does not obviously intend this as an endorsement of a notion of “con-
tentful” experience in our contemporary sense.
8.3  Does Experience Have Content?
Our question is whether Kant endorses the claim that experience has 
nonconceptual content. I have argued that the standard notion of con-
tent which is presupposed by this question is that of a proposition—
something which is the potential object of different epistemic attitudes 
in one subject, is communicable across subjects, and which is the bearer 
of truth and falsity. I have argued further that the correlative notion of 
a proposition in Kant’s philosophy is that of a judgement and that his 
own usage of the term “content” to specify a type of relation to an object 
can partially be accounted for in terms of our contemporary notion of a 
descriptive specification of an object or state of affairs.
However, there are several hurdles that face the intelligibility of the 
question as to whether Kant admits that experience, that is, intuition, has 
nonconceptual content. The first is that if the analysis in Sect. 8.2 is cor-
rect then the claim that intuition has conceptual content is really just the 
claim that it has judgemental content, without which it could not qualify 
as intuition. While there have been prominent interpretations which tie 
intuition essentially to judgement, the view has recently been roundly 
criticised for a variety of reasons including the fact that it seems to conflate 
judgement with synthesis more generally.10 Moreover, in a 1791 letter to 
9 For example, this seems to be one of the central ways in which Robert Hanna distinguishes 
between conceptual and nonconceptual representation. See Hanna (2005, 2008); cf. Thompson 
(1972).
10 For interpretations tying judgement to intuition, see Paton (1936:285), Pippin (1982:33) and 
Strawson (1966:94). For extensive criticism of “judgementalist” readings of Kant, see Grüne 
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J. S. Beck addressing just this issue, Kant explicitly denies that “the rela-
tion of intuition to an object in general” is the work of judgement (Br, 
11:311). Since concepts are, for Kant, “predicates of possible judgment” 
(A69/B94) and the “understanding can make no other use of [them] … 
than that of judging by means of them” (A68/B93; cf. Heis 2014a), their 
deployment is restricted to their role in judgement. Since Kant has ruled 
out judgement as that which connects an intuition to its object, it seems 
that concepts cannot themselves be contents of intuition.
If it is not textually plausible to understand the content of an intuition 
in conceptual terms (at least as Kant understands the notion of a con-
cept) then what would it mean to say that Kant endorses conceptualism 
with regard to experience? In keeping with our contemporary notion of 
a content as setting a veridicality condition for a mental state, one might 
be tempted by the line of thought suggested at the end of Sect. 8.2, 
namely, that intuition relates to its object immediately in virtue of the 
kind of veridicality condition (“content” in our sense) possessed by intui-
tive representations.
The conceptualist would then have to explain how the intuition has 
the kind of content that it does, namely, the possession of a veridicality 
condition, something that could be the object of an epistemic attitude and 
(potentially) communicated in an explicit judgement—without thereby 
construing it in terms of judgement (or even a concept). And since we 
have ruled out a concept’s figuring, via judgement, as the content of an 
intuition, the most plausible thing a conceptualist might say is that con-
cepts are nevertheless partly responsible for the generation of the intuition, 
as rules for synthesis enacted on (non-contentful) sensory impressions.11
Though the details of the view may vary, I take the heart of this version 
of the conceptualist interpretation as one according to which concepts 
play a role in the generation of intuitive representations. The conceptual-
ist can then argue that it is at least partly in virtue of this generative role 
that intuitions possess veridicality conditions. These generative condi-
tions are what serve to constitute an intuition’s presentation of an object 
(often construed in terms of the intuition’s intentionality), as well as the 
(2009), Chap. 2.2, and Land (2015b).
11 For examples of this kind of view, see Anderson (2015), Friedman (2015), Ginsborg (2008), 
Grüne (2009), Haag (2007), Land (2015a), Longuenesse (1998a) and Pereboom (1988).
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intuition’s relevance to other epistemic attitudes, both in the acquisition 
of empirical concepts, and in the warrant the intuition provides for basic 
perceptual beliefs. Prescinding from the details of this interpretation (or 
family of interpretations), it is this central claim regarding the generation 
of intuition that I think is mistaken, and which I take to be the primary 
issue of debate between so-called conceptualists and nonconceptualists.
But even this alternative way of interpreting the issue of conceptual-
ism in Kant’s theory of experience is problematic, for at least two reasons. 
First, a central motivation for nonconceptualist readings of Kantian intu-
ition stems from the case of apparent perceptual experience in beings 
which lack the relevant concepts, such as infants and non-human animals. 
The animal case is especially problematic since non-human animals lack 
(according to Kant) even the capacity to acquire concepts. Thus the need 
to account for such cases remains even if a conceptualist construes their 
position in terms of the role concepts play in the generation of intuition 
rather than as its “judgemental” content. Second, the “generative” read-
ing, which eschews positing judgements and their component concepts 
as the contents of intuitions, still presupposes that the relevant distinction 
between mere sensation and genuine intuition hinges on the possession 
of a correctness condition. But, as I have argued elsewhere, this presup-
position is incorrect. Kant does not ascribe to correctness conditions any 
fundamental explanatory role in his conception of intuition. In fact, he 
seems to eschew ascribing correctness conditions to intuition altogether 
(see McLear 2016 for extensive discussion). The fact that this central 
assumption is mistaken threatens the coherence of a content- centred 
interpretative debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists.
If the debate concerning the content of intuition has presupposed a 
notion of “content” that Kant rejects, then how should we understand 
the debate? In the next section, I argue that we should not frame the 
debate in terms of the presence or absence in experience of a particular 
kind of content, and thus of the presence or absence of correctness conditions 
that could be the object of doxastic attitudes, but rather in terms of the 
presence or absence of particular kinds of cognitive ability and the depen-
dence relations that may or may not hold between such abilities and the 
occurrence or generation of experience (intuition).
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8.4  Reframing the Debate
I have argued thus far that, at root, the conceptualism debate should be 
understood as concerned with the conditions under which intuitions are 
generated rather than the “content” of an intuition as a kind of correct-
ness condition.12 Here we can distinguish two broad camps, each of which 
construe these conditions differently. On the one side is Intellectualism, 
which construes the generation of intuition as dependent on the higher 
discursive activity of the intellect (i.e. understanding, judgement and 
reason).13 By contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some intuitions do 
not rely for their existence or generation on any activity of the intellect.
Sensibilism and Intellectualism can agree that sensing and think-
ing involve distinct (and distinctive) cognitive abilities. In this regard, 
Sensibilism is not to be confused with a crude empiricism. Moreover, 
both Sensibilism and Intellectualism explain the generation and structure 
of representations or mental states at least partly in terms of the relevant 
cognitive capacity or faculty. The key difference is that Intellectualism 
construes the structure of intuitive representations, and ultimately even 
their generation, as dependent not only on sensibility but also on the 
understanding, and possibly other “higher” cognitive faculties as well 
(e.g.  judgement or reason). For the Intellectualist, the only representa-
tions which do not admit of this dependence are the simple sensations 
that are the supposed initial product of sensibility, in its interface with, or 
passive “affection” by, mind-independent reality.14
By contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some objective sensory 
states, including the “pure” representations of space and time, possess 
structure which is not the product of the activity of the intellect. Moreover, 
Sensibilism construes such representations, at least in some cases, as gener-
ated without, and in principle independently of, the activity of the intellect.
12 In this sense I am in agreement with the emphasis on generation of intuition in recent interpreta-
tions such as Grüne (2009), Land (2015b) and Longuenesse (1998a).
13 Note that I use “discursive” here to denote not concepts, but the activity of the mind in the “run-
ning through, and taking together” of representations (A99).
14 Since sensations are simple, they do not admit of structure, and thus according to Intellectualism 
do not depend on the activity of the intellect.
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There are at least three benefits to reframing the debate in this manner. 
First, we avoid any attribution to Kant of the (in my view) controver-
sial assumption that intuition essentially has a correctness condition that 
could be the object of epistemic attitudes.15 Of course, a proponent of 
Intellectualism might argue to the conclusion that intuitions essentially 
have correctness conditions as a result of their generation by acts of syn-
thesis. But this would need to be shown as part of the Intellectualist’s 
argument, rather than as an assumption thereof.
Second, and perhaps surprisingly, avoiding the content assumption 
and reframing things in terms of cognitive abilities actually brings Kant 
closer to aspects of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind. 
This is due to two features of the contemporary debate. The first feature 
I have in mind is the extraordinarily wide range of views concerning the 
existence and nature of concepts.16 Hence, asking whether Kant accepts 
the existence of nonconceptual content in experience requires a great deal 
of triangulation with respect to what one might mean by “concept” or its 
cognates.17 Reframing things in terms of cognitive abilities lets us side-
step much of this discussion. A second feature of contemporary debate in 
the philosophy of mind is that, since Gareth Evans’s seminal 1982 work, 
The Varieties of Reference, many philosophers have been influenced by the 
idea that what we mean in talking about thought as being “conceptual” 
or “conceptually articulated” is best understood in terms of its having a 
structure that is the product of the exercise of two or more distinct abili-
ties. Evans puts things this way:
15 There are, nevertheless, various weaker senses in which an intuition might have a correctness 
condition. For further discussion, see McLear (2016).
16 For a sampling of the variety, see Machery (2009) and Margolis and Laurence (2014).
17 For example, much of the contemporary debate has been concerned with the difference between 
“state” views and “content” views (see Heck 2000, Speaks 2005 and Van Cleve 2012). This distinc-
tion has also exerted itself in the Kantian debate (e.g. Allais 2009, Faggion 2015, Grüne 2011 and 
Hanna 2011a, b). But according to e.g. the Fregean tradition of understanding conceptual content, 
it makes no sense to say that one could be in a state with conceptual content C without also thereby 
being able to grasp that content C, i.e. without also possessing the concept. Of course, one could 
argue that Kant should or should not be understood in terms of the Fregean tradition (cf. Tolley 
2014 for a defence of the Fregean reading), but this would be a further move. It would perhaps be 
better if we could avoid these interpretative difficulties altogether.
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If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have 
the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every 
property of being G of which he has a conception. This is the condition 
that I call “The Generality Constraint”. … I shall speak … of the concepts 
a subject has, of this or that property. And I shall allow myself to say that 
this or that particular thought-episode comprises such-and-such an Idea of 
an object, as well as such-and-such a concept. This is simply a picturesque 
way of rephrasing the notion that the thought is a joint exercise of two 
distinguishable abilities. (1982:104)
So part of what Evans means by the notion of a content’s being concep-
tual is that it belongs to an episode of thinking understood as an exercise 
of the distinct cognitive abilities defined by the Generality Constraint. 
Evans also appeals to this conception of concept possession to distin-
guish between states that have and states that lack conceptual content (cf. 
Evans 1982:104n.22, 226–7).
The view that conceptual content be understood in such terms has 
been influential, and several of the central participants in the contempo-
rary debate concerning the content of perception endorse it.18 It is there-
fore unsurprising that those who would accept that experience might 
have nonconceptual content also reject the claim that all content be 
understood in terms of the exercise of abilities which obey the Generality 
Constraint (cf. Beck 2012, 2013).19 So a benefit of reframing the Kantian 
debate with respect to cognitive abilities is that it intersects nicely with 
contemporary discussion without thereby requiring us to say anything 
more specific about the nature of concepts.
A third benefit is that the Intellectualist/Sensibilist distinction brings 
unity where we might otherwise find dissent. For example, with respect 
to the debate concerning whether the content of intuition should be 
understood in terms of judgement, or instead in terms of the exercise 
18 See e.g. Dummett (1993), Geach (1957), Kenny (2010), McDowell (1990, 1998) and Peacocke 
(1992). For criticism, see Davis (2005:144–5). For recent work implicitly or explicitly connecting 
Kant to this tradition, see Allais (2015), Dunlop (2012), Hanna (2005), Heis (2014b) and 
Longuenesse (1998a).
19 There is, of course, the question as to whether Kant endorses the Generality Constraint as it is 
typically understood. Some support for thinking that he does comes in the footnote at B133–4, but 
more needs to be said concerning this matter. I shall pursue this issue in future work.
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of a conceptually guided synthesis (cf. Land 2015b), it might seem that 
there is strong disagreement concerning the content of experience and 
the role of the understanding in cognition. However, this internecine 
debate hides what I take to be fundamental agreement between the two 
“conceptualist” camps—namely, that Kant strongly ties the exercise of 
intellectual cognitive capacities to the conditions governing the possibil-
ity of objective sensory experience. This position takes as central Kant’s 
claim that
the same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judg-
ment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an 
intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of under-
standing. (A79/B104–5)
The Intellectualist reading of this passage focuses on the claim that the 
very same cognitive capacities are at work in judgement and in intuition. 
Since this claim concerns the unity of judgement and intuition it might 
even seem reasonable to say that the structure of each kind of representa-
tion is supposed to depend on the activity of the intellect. It would then 
be this activity which brings it about that the representations have objec-
tivity in Kant’s sense of “relation to an object” (B137).20 By reframing the 
conceptualism debate in terms of the Intellectualist/Sensibilist divide, we 
can highlight the most important aspects of the dispute, while neverthe-
less allowing that there might be differences of interpretation within each 
camp regarding the precise way in which Kant adheres to one or the other 
side of the divide.21
With these points in mind we can revise our previous framing of the 
conceptualism debate in Sects. 8.2 and 8.3 to read it as instead resting 
on three distinct but interrelated claims: (i) the content of an intuition is 
a kind of relation to an object; (ii) the relation to an object depends on 
20 For an alternative reading of this passage, and the notion of a “relation to an object”, see McLear 
(forthcoming a); cf. Allais (2015), Chap. 11.
21 A further virtue of the capacities-based approach that I advocate here is that it helps to make sense 
of the way in which Kant understands that infants and non-human animals might or might not 
have experience of an objective world. I lack the space to discuss appropriately this issue here, but 
see McLear (2011) and McLear (forthcoming a) for further discussion.
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the possession of a privileged set of cognitive capacities—specifically, the 
capacity to carry out a “synthesis” directed in accordance with concepts; 
(iii) synthesis in accordance with concepts sets correctness conditions for 
the intuition’s representation of a mind-independent object.
If the conceptualism debate is thus really best reconceived as concern-
ing the kinds of mental acts a cognitive subject is able to perform, and 
the role of those acts in imparting a particular kind of structure to a sub-
ject’s mental states, then our original question as to whether Kant recog-
nises the existence of nonconceptual content in experience breaks down 
into two more fundamental ones. First, we can ask whether the cognitive 
capacities necessary for the generation of an intuition themselves impart 
or otherwise determine a correctness condition for the intuition. Second, 
we can ask whether the generation of an intuition always and everywhere 
depends on the exercise of distinctively intellectual capacities, whether 
or not such an exercise would impart or otherwise determine any sort of 
correctness condition. I argue elsewhere that we have reason to answer 
both questions negatively.22
One might try to circumvent the Intellectualism/Sensibilism dichot-
omy that I have sketched by arguing that the two aspects of Intellectualism 
as I have articulated it—namely, the determination of correctness condi-
tions in intuition and the dependence of intuition on an exercise of dis-
tinctively intellectual cognitive capacities—come apart. It seems possible 
to reject the first claim—that intuition has content determined by the 
exercise of intellectual capacities—but endorse the second claim—that 
the generation of intuition is nonetheless dependent on distinctively 
intellectual capacities.
For example James Messina (2014) argues for a reading of the rela-
tionship between the output of representations by sensibility and the 
exercise of intellectual capacities that seeks to exploit a supposed middle 
ground between the two kinds of dependence that I have sketched. This 
reading states that the unity of the pure forms of intuition—namely, 
the representations of space and time—metaphysically depends on, and 
is only possible through, the activity of the original synthetic unity of 
 apperception. Since I take this form of dependence to be a central point 
22 See McLear (2015, 2016); cf. McLear (2014b).
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at issue, I would regard such a position as a form of Intellectualism. But 
what distinguishes Messina’s position from other forms of Intellectualism 
is his denial that “this unity [of the representations of space and time] is 
the output or result of the figurative synthesis, or any other act of synthe-
sis for that matter” (2014:23).23
While this view is very interesting, and coherently maps a portion of 
logical space, I fail to see any compelling reason for thinking that Kant 
would have (or should have) endorsed it. The problem is that the view 
seems to inherit a central fault of Intellectualism without inheriting one 
of its (putative) central merits. According to Messina, the objective status 
of a subject’s sensory states depends on her possessing, and exercising, 
intellectual cognitive capacities. This means that Messina’s interpreta-
tion inherits all of the traditional problems with respect to non-rational 
beings that dog more standard versions of Intellectualism. But since, on 
this reading, intuition does not ultimately depend for its structure on the 
activity of the intellect, but rather on the (unsynthesised) “pure” forms of 
space and time, there is no sense in which we can appeal to the structure 
of thought (or the capacity to think) to explain the ultimate intelligi-
bility of spatially and temporally structured objects, as Intellectualism 
attempts to. Intellectualism can at least purport to offer an explanation 
as to why spatial and temporal objects are intelligible to thought. This is 
because it sees the generation of the pure intuitions of space and time as 
dependent upon a figurative synthesis which is itself dependent upon the 
possession and exercise of intellectual cognitive capacities (such as the 
understanding and the capacity to judge). But Messina’s proposed inter-
pretation provides no such benefit, because it denies that the intuitions of 
space and time are the result of a figurative synthesis, while nevertheless 
severely limiting the sense in which sensibility is construed by Kant as an 
independent faculty capable of generating its own class of objective men-
tal states. So while I take Messina’s interpretation to be logically  possible, 
23 However, Messina (2014:13) does seem to think that the representation of determinate spaces 
and lines depends on synthesis, which would seem to preclude infants and non-human animals 
from having such representations. That would mean that they could neither represent locations in 
space or edges or boundaries of objects. This seems both philosophically and textually problematic. 
For discussion regarding Kant’s views on the cognitive capabilities of non-human animals, see Allais 
(2009:405–8), McLear (2011), McLear (forthcoming a) and Naragon (1990).
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it fails to capture the underlying basis for postulating a dependence rela-
tion between the two faculties, and thus is, to that extent, dialectically 
unmotivated.24
8.5  Modality and Cognition
As I mentioned in Sect. 8.1, three issues of central and enduring philo-
sophical interest concern the relationship that experience has to the con-
tent of our concepts (and thus what we believe and know), the fixation of 
basic perceptual belief, and the justification or warrant for those beliefs. It 
is at least partly due to interest in Kant’s position regarding these endur-
ing issues that scholars have focused so heavily on the question of his 
views concerning concepts and the content of experience.
It is widely acknowledged that, with respect to the first issue, Kant’s 
conception of empirical concept acquisition via abstraction faces serious 
interpretative and philosophical difficulties.25 Concerning the second, 
Kant says remarkably little about exactly how it is that sensory experience 
gives rise to empirical judgement. I shall focus, in a somewhat indirect 
way, on the third issue, concerning empirical warrant, and specifically 
on the way in which intuition puts a subject in a position to prove the 
real possibility of a represented object. Such proof is a necessary condi-
tion of cognition, and although cognition is different from knowledge 
(i.e. Erkenntnis is not Wissen), it is necessary for possessing substantive 
empirical knowledge (see Chignell 2014; Schafer, forthcoming). My aim 
here is both to clarify the role of intuition in proving the possibility of the 
objects of cognition, and to show that the Intellectualist position faces a 
significant challenge in accommodating this account, one not faced by 
Sensibilism as I interpret it.26
24 Thanks to James Messina for discussion concerning these points.
25 See Anderson (2015), Ginsborg (2006a, b), Longuenesse (1998a) and Pippin (1982).
26 For previous discussion of intuition, content and modality, see McLear (2016). For criticism of 
this account, see Grüne (2014a). For ease of exposition I construe cognition as a necessary condi-
tion of empirical knowledge. However, as Chignell (2014:576–9) points out, Kant seems to allow 
that there are cases where the grounds of knowledge may not require cognition, such as with ana-
lytic knowledge and negative knowledge of things in themselves. These caveats are assumed 
throughout my discussion.
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One of the central claims of Kant’s Critical philosophy is that reason-
ing in accordance with logical principles cannot, by itself, provide a sub-
ject with knowledge of the world. The possibility of ampliative knowledge 
concerning the world requires that the mind obtain its subject matter from 
something other than the activity of the intellect, and thus, given our cog-
nitive constraints, via sensibility. This is one of the many ways in which 
our understanding differs from that of an intuitive intellect (B145–6).
A second contribution of intuition to knowledge, beyond that of 
obtaining a subject matter for thought, is in the satisfaction of what we 
can call Kant’s modal condition on cognition and knowledge. One of 
Kant’s main criticisms of the German rationalist tradition is that the prin-
ciple of contradiction cannot provide us with positive cognition of the 
world. He (here in agreement with Crusius) argues that a further positive 
contribution is needed to separate what is merely logically possible from 
what is genuinely metaphysically possible.27 In this way, Kant’s Critical 
philosophy is a radical departure from the German rationalist tradition 
exemplified by Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten, amongst others.
Cognition, and ultimately empirical knowledge, depends on being 
able to show the metaphysical possibility of the concept’s being instanti-
ated—its “objective validity”.28 The point that a proof of real possibility 
is necessary for cognition is made explicitly by Kant in the preface to the 
B edition of the First Critique:
To cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility 
(whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori 
through reason). But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contra-
dict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I 
27 As L.W. Beck says, “what Kant did learn from Crusius must not be underestimated; he learned that 
‘the rain never follows the wind because of the law of identity’” (Beck 1978:94). Beck cites here Kant’s 
Negative Magnitudes from 1763 (NG, 2:203). See also Hogan (2009) and Watkins (2005:162–5).
28 Note that I take the notion of objective validity to be distinct from, and typically more demand-
ing than, objective reality. As Winkler (2010:69) has helpfully noted, for Kant, a concept is objec-
tively real if and only if its corresponding object is really possible, while a concept is objectively 
valid if and only if objects can be thought or experienced only by its means (A97; A89–90/B122; 
A93/B126; A111). It is presumably this demanding sense that is at issue in TD. At other times 
there is a less demanding use of “objective validity”, where it seems to act more as a substitute or 
synonym for “objective reality” (see Bxxiv; Bxxvii; A156/B195; A311/B368; A669/B697).
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 cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object 
somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. But in order to ascribe 
objective validity to such a concept (real possibility, for the first sort of pos-
sibility was merely logical) something more is required. (Bxxvin.)
Kant’s point here is that the structure of thought is governed ulti-
mately by the rule of non-contradiction, and in this way mirrors what 
is logically possible. But an analysis of thought tells us nothing as to 
whether there really, that is, metaphysically, could be an object such as 
the thought specifies. Kant further distinguishes between logical and 
real possibility in terms of the notion of “cancellation” (Aufhebung). 
The subject matter of a thought is logically possible if the thought’s 
constituent concepts may be combined in judgement without con-
tradiction, and thus without being logically cancelled out (A151/
B190; NG, 2:171–2). The subject matter of a thought is really pos-
sible, by contrast, if it can be shown that the subject matter to which 
the thought corresponds consists of properties which are mutually 
empirically compossible and not, in Kant’s terms, “really repugnant”. 
This is perhaps best illustrated with examples involving physical forces 
(e.g. opposite motions, or opposing attractive and repulsive forces; 
cf. A264–5/B320–1). Since real repugnance cannot solely be deter-
mined via consideration of the logical possibility of the subject as 
conceived, cognition requires the demonstration of the real possibil-
ity of the object through some means other than mere conception.29 
Call this condition on proof of possibility the “Modal Condition” 
(Chignell 2010:146). Kant indicates in the passage quoted above that 
real and not merely logical possibility must be provable via experience 
or a priori argument (e.g. a transcendental deduction) if cognition is 
to be possible. We can then more clearly define the modal condition 
on cognition as follows:
29 See Chignell (2010:144–5; 2014:581–2), Warren (2001), Chap. 1, and Watkins (2005:162–5).
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Modal condition:
Necessarily, S cognises an object O only if S is in a position to prove the real 
possibility of an object possessing the features constituting the content of 
the representation of O.30
While it is not totally obvious what proof of real possibility comes to in 
all cases,31 it is clear from the quoted passage that Kant thinks that one way 
of proving the real possibility of an object is to demonstrate its actuality via 
a presentation of that object in experience. Surely then, in such a case the 
content of an intuition must play a decisive role in satisfying the Modal 
Condition, for what other kind of representation could do so in the case of 
experience?
Kant’s modal condition on cognition thus presents a challenge: how 
must experience be if it is to play its stated role in satisfying the Modal 
Condition? As I discuss below, Intellectualism must provide a specific 
answer to this question, which I argue is less convincing and more prob-
lematic than the kind of answer provided by a Sensibilist interpretation.
8.5.1  Intellectualism and the Modal Condition
Recall that Intellectualism makes two claims concerning the relation 
between the intellect and sensibility. First, it claims that the generation of 
intuition by sensibility depends in part on cognitive acts carried out by 
the intellect. Second, it claims that these cognitive acts are necessary for 
imparting content (in our contemporary sense) to the intuition, in virtue 
of which it has relation to an object.
This conception of the generation and content of intuition puts con-
straints on how intuition might satisfy the modal condition. Insofar as it 
is the content of intuition that makes the relevant contribution to proof 
of real possibility, it must either come from the cognitive activity of the 
30 Relatedly, if O is really impossible, then S could cognise its real impossibility only if she were in 
a position to prove it (cf. Chignell 2014:584).
31 For discussion of complications surrounding the articulation of the modal condition, see Chignell 
(2014); cf. Stang (2011, 2016).
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intellect, or from the nature of intuition itself. In the former case, there 
can be no proof of real possibility, for intellectual acts of synthesis are 
discursive, and thus constrained only by the law of non-contradiction 
and the categories. The Intellectualist should therefore prefer the latter 
case, in which the (a priori) formal sensory conditions of space and time 
determine what is really possible. The vast extent of the logically possible 
would thus be understood as constrained by the nature of experience and 
its spatial and temporal conditions.
This view seems to accord with Kant’s explanation of his notion of real 
possibility in the section of the First Critique entitled The Postulates of 
Empirical Thinking. There he writes: 
Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance 
with intuition and concepts) is possible. (A218/B265)32
According to this passage, cognition of the real possibility of an object 
requires only that it conform to the formal conditions, both sensible and 
conceptual, of experience. Clearly, every object of intuition conforms to 
the sensible formal conditions of experience, since every object of intu-
ition or experience must have spatial or temporal structure. Furthermore, 
according to Intellectualist interpretations of Kant, every object of expe-
rience or intuition conforms to the conceptual formal conditions of expe-
rience, namely the categories, because every intuition is generated by a 
synthesis that takes place in accordance with the categories.33 Thus, every 
intuition, regardless of whether the object it represents exists or not, con-
forms to the formal conditions of experience, and is therefore the repre-
sentation of an object that is really possible. Moreover, the discussion of 
the formal conditions of experience says nothing about real repugnance 
or compossibility. Hence, according to this defence of Intellectualism, 
there is no need to recognise a further contribution of intuition to a 
32 Even though, in this passage, Kant only uses the term “possibility”, from the context it is clear 
that he is concerned with real possibility. A little bit later he equates “objective reality of the con-
cept” with “possibility of such an object as is thought through the concept” (A220/B268). And in 
other passages he equates objective reality with real possibility (see e.g. FM, 20:325ff.).
33 Exemplars of this view include Grüne (2009, 2014a), Haag (2007), Longuenesse (1998a) and 
Pereboom (1988).
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proof of real possibility other than its contribution of spatial and 
temporal form.34
While this manner of responding to the challenge of articulating the 
contribution of intuition to the satisfaction of the modal condition is 
attractive, it also suffers from three serious problems. These are, respec-
tively, that (i) it is too weak, (ii) it does not properly distinguish between 
perception and hallucination, and (iii) it does not account for Kant’s 
appeal at Bxxiv (quoted above) to the actuality of what is presented in 
experience. I take these points in turn.
First, there are cases in which intuition of the actuality of an object 
proves its real possibility, but does so in virtue of something much richer 
than mere formal possibility as construed above.
Consider, for example, the discovery of the platypus. The existence of 
such an egg-laying, duck-billed, beaver-tailed, otter-footed mammal was 
surely something that was in conformity with the formal laws of experi-
ence (i.e. the categories plus the pure forms of intuition), but European 
scientists had no idea prior to the discovery of a live specimen in 1798 
that the co-instantiation of such features was really possible in nature. The 
intuition that proved its real possibility, in this case via its actuality, thus 
did more than show just that its existence conformed with the formal 
conditions of experience.
Further, Kant himself mentions several cases whose real possibil-
ity does not seem to be determinable by appeal to formal conditions 
alone. He mentions the power to be present in a space without filling 
it (e.g. as a ghost) or to intuit the future (e.g. clairvoyance) and to have 
telepathic contact with the minds of others (A222/B270). He considers 
these all possibilities which are “entirely groundless” because they “cannot 
be grounded in experience and its known laws” (A223/B270). As other 
commentators have noted, it is not clear why these examples could not be 
grounded in the relatively weak conditions designated by the elaboration 
of formal possibility described above.35 So Kant’s appeal to  experience 
34 A further avenue of objection to Intellectualism, which I do not pursue here, concerns whether it 
makes sense to construe spatial and temporal form as, on the Intellectualist account, sufficiently 
independent of the intellect and its activity to count as making a genuinely independent contribu-
tion to cognition. For relevant discussion, see McLear (2015) and Messina (2014).
35 For discussion, see Chignell (2014:588–9).
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and its known laws would suggest that he has something in mind stron-
ger than simply formal possibility. Intellectualism, limited as it is to 
appealing solely to formal possibility, cannot explain what this might be.
Second, returning to the example of the platypus, Intellectualism can-
not explain how seeing a platypus would be any different for proving its 
real possibility than hallucinating a platypus (or a mammal with platy-
pus-like features). This is not to say that Intellectualism cannot distin-
guish between hallucination and perception, but rather that its basis for 
doing so is neutral with regard to answering the question of the contri-
bution of intuition to the satisfaction of the Modal Condition. For the 
Intellectualist, the representational content contributed by an intuition 
in both cases will be identical.36 But, prior to 1798, while many biologists 
might have believed that one could hallucinate such an animal, no one 
would have thought hallucination proof enough that such an animal was 
really a possible denizen of the natural world.37
A proponent of Intellectualism might respond here by pointing out 
that, given the reproductive nature of the imagination, all merely imagi-
native acts which nevertheless show the real possibility of something—
e.g. of a platypus before 1798—depend on awareness of actual sensory 
qualities that the subject has been aware of in the past (Anth, 7:167–8).38 
So Intellectualism can allow a role for actuality in order to explain how 
the imagination can engage in the kinds of recombinative acts necessary 
to determining real possibility. The important difference is that, accord-
ing to this reply, we do not need the actuality of a particular object to prove 
its real possibility, but rather only the actuality of the relevant property 
or properties it would instantiate so that sensation of such properties can 
be imagined and recombined with other (previously) sensed properties 
into the intuition of, for example, a (hallucinated) duck-billed platypus.39
36 Here John McDowell’s interpretation stands as an outlier for he argues both that the content of 
sensory experience depends on intellectual capacities and that intuition is object-dependent. See 
McDowell (1998) for discussion. More paradigmatic examples of Intellectualism as I am conceiv-
ing it here are Grüne (2009, 2014a), Pereboom (1988) and Stephenson (2011).
37 This would be true even in a case of “veridical hallucination” where one, say, visually hallucinates 
a platypus while in the presence of a platypus matching the features so hallucinated.
38 See McLear (forthcoming b) and Stephenson (2015b) for extensive discussion of the issue of 
hallucination.
39 Thanks to Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson for discussion on this point.
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In reply to this, it is important to note that one of the primary motives 
for Kant’s rejection of logical possibility as an appropriate guide to 
metaphysical possibility lies in the fact that it is too weak to exclude 
arbitrary (though logically consistent) combinations of predicates (see 
Chignell 2010). If Kant allows that the reproductive imagination can 
combine any sensory property it pleases with any other, so long as they 
have been previously experienced, without their ever having been instan-
tiated in one and the same object (something that seems not to be ruled 
out by the very wide definition of formal possibility as concerning merely 
the categories plus the pure forms of intuition), then sensibility might 
offer only slightly more demanding constraints on arbitrary combination 
than those put on the understanding by the law of non-contradiction. 
This way of construing Kant’s position effectively collapses the satisfac-
tion of the Modal Condition into the provisioning of sensory material for 
thought. On this view the role of sensibility is to provide the mind with 
raw sensory material and nothing else. All other cognitive work is done 
by the recombinative activity of the imagination and of thought. While 
I cannot entirely rule this out as an interpretation, it seems to fit poorly 
with Kant’s conception of sensibility as providing significant cognitive 
constraint on the arbitrary activities of our spontaneous discursive nature.
Third, in Kant’s statement of the Modal Condition on cognition in 
the preface to the First Critique he explicitly mentions the revelation of 
actuality in experience. Once again, in the relevant portion of that text 
Kant states that
it is required that I be able to prove [the object’s] possibility (whether by 
the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori through reason). 
(Bxxvi; emphasis added)
However, Intellectualism leaves it a mystery as to why Kant would appeal 
to actuality in this manner. According to Intellectualism, there is no need 
to appeal to an actually presented object in order to prove its real pos-
sibility. Instead, all that is needed is for the representation of the object 
to be one whose features satisfy the formal conditions of experience. This 
is why, on the Intellectualist view, hallucination can suffice for proof 
of real possibility. But if that were true, then appeal to actuality would 
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do no genuine work with respect to proof of real possibility. Thus, it is 
unclear why, on the Intellectualist interpretation, Kant would specifically 
 mention actuality in a central statement of the nature of cognition and 
the contribution of experience to the satisfaction of its requirements.
If the above discussion is correct, then Intellectualism cannot con-
strue intuition as satisfying the Modal Condition on anything other than 
the most general “formal” level. Intuition, according to Intellectualism, 
makes no further contribution to determining whether something is 
really possible according to the specific natural laws governing our world. 
This leaves it a complete mystery as to how cases of the actuality of the 
object, as presented in an occurrent intuition, might play any special sort 
of role in providing the proof necessary for cognition. This is dissatisfying 
both philosophically and textually.
8.5.2  Acquaintance and the Modal Condition
In contrast to Intellectualism, I suggest that we understand intuition as 
a cognitive route to actuality.40 Intuition can prove the possibility of an 
object by relating the subject to an actuality which is the ground of the 
relevant possibility, thus providing its “proof”. Intuition, being partly 
constituted by some actuality to which it relates, thereby provides an 
intuiting subject with access to an actuality in virtue of which, and in 
combination with her higher cognitive capacities of understanding and 
judgement, she can cognise, and perhaps come to know, the real possibil-
ity of some truth or judgement.
According to my preferred Sensibilist account, an intuition is a rela-
tion that immediately—i.e. non-inferentially and without appeal to any 
of the subject’s background beliefs—presents its object. Since intuition 
40 I am specifically concerned with empirical intuition here, but I think the claim could be gener-
alised to cover Kant’s conception of intuition as a whole. For such a general framework to work, 
more needs to be said about how intellectual and a priori intuition fit into this framework. As I see 
it, intellectual, a priori and empirical intuitions are all relations to actualities. The difference is that 
in intellectual and empirical intuition there is causal determination, either from intellectual intu-
ition to its object, or from object to the (subject of the) empirical intuition. A priori intuition is the 
most difficult case, since space and time are not existing objects in their own right (A291/B347), 
and so cannot straightforwardly cause or be caused by the intuition of them. I intend to address 
these issues in future work.
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is understood to be a relation, it could not exist without the presence of 
its object, and it is in virtue of the object’s being, in this sense, a con-
stituent of the subject’s mental state that she is in a position to appeal to 
it in the course of making judgements about the subject matter of her 
experience.41
Thus, on this reading, intuition is a form of non-propositional aware-
ness, which can be thought of along the lines of “acquaintance” with 
one’s environment. Intuition (or the psychological state thereof ) need 
not be thought of in terms of a relation to a “content” in the contem-
porary sense, nor as depending on the exercise of intellectual cognitive 
capacities. Visual, auditory and tactile experience are perhaps the most 
prominent sense modalities for acquainting a subject with her environ-
ment, and do so in obviously distinctive ways. These sensory modalities 
(and perhaps the others) provide a form of access to the environment, 
that is, they make it immediately available to consciousness in a particu-
lar sensory way.42
The term “acquaintance” has connotations often associated with its 
deployment by British philosophers as an epistemically foundational 
mental state which must itself satisfy stringent epistemic conditions. 
The stringent character of these epistemic conditions, such as possess-
ing infallible knowledge of the existence, identity and nature of what is 
experienced, convinced figures such as Russell that acquaintance rela-
tions cannot hold between subjects and their environment but rather 
only between subjects and mental items (e.g. sense-data) or universals (cf. 
Russell 1997:46–7; 1910).
Kant does not adopt Russell’s stringent epistemological charac-
terisation of acquaintance. In particular, he does not hold that being 
acquainted with some part of one’s environment E, of itself, entails 
that one knows anything about E. Acquaintance is thus not to be con-
41 This position raises obvious issues concerning intuition and hallucination. I articulate an account 
of intuition with respect to hallucination in McLear (forthcoming b).
42 Kant specifies that three of the five senses, namely sight, touch and hearing, are forms of “objec-
tive” empirical intuition (Anth, 7:154) in virtue of being more conducive to physical object cogni-
tion than introspective cognition of the subject’s own state. The other two senses, taste and smell, 
are “subjective” and have less to do with our perception of objects than with our “enjoyment” 
(Genuss) in the object (Anth, 7:154). It is thus possible that Kant thinks the sensory modes of taste 
and smell do not provide outer intuitions at all.
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fused with knowledge. Neither does Kant privilege certainty concern-
ing the character of one’s subjective states over certainty concerning the 
character of one’s environment (A370–1).43 According to the version of 
Sensibilism I advocate, Kant understands acquaintance as serving a more 
cognitively basic epistemic function than either providing knowledge 
or, more generally, warranting an epistemic attitude. Instead, it is the 
basis of what Kant calls “cognition” (Erkenntnis), insofar as the term 
“cognition” attaches primarily to representations and not propositional 
attitudes.
We can see the advantages of this account when we look at the three 
objections I raised to Intellectualism in the previous section. Clearly, my 
interpretation accords with the Bxxvi textual reference to actualities that 
are presented via experience. My preferred interpretation also properly 
distinguishes between perception and hallucination. Since the intuited 
object is a partial constituent of the relevant sensory experience, it is the 
actuality of the object that grounds proof of its real possibility. In the 
case of hallucination, no external object is present, and so there is no 
corresponding ground of proof. Finally, in the case of the platypus prior 
to 1798—as well as Kant’s own examples of telepathy, clairvoyance and 
ghostly matter—I take Kant to be appealing to the fact that there is no 
experienced or causally inferable actuality to which one might appeal in 
grounding the real possibility of such cases. This is clear from his point at 
the beginning of the next paragraph that
I leave aside everything the possibility of which can only be derived from actu-
ality in experience, and consider here only the possibility of things through 
concepts a priori, about which I proceed to assert that it can never occur by 
itself solely from such concepts, but always only as formal and objective 
conditions of an experience in general. (A223/B270–1; emphasis added)
I take Kant’s point here to be that his prior appeal to “experience and 
its known laws” (A223/B270) was an appeal to actualities that are 
either presented in particular experiences or are inferable via appeal 
43 It is this dependency relation that Kant emphasises when he says in Metaphysik K2 (1790s) that 
“I would have no inner sense if I had no outer sense” (V-Met-K2/Heinze, 28:771). Similar points 
are made in the Refutation of Idealism in the Critique.
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to causal laws (A225–6/B272–3).44 Again, I take my interpretation to 
explain better his appeal to actuality than that which could be offered 
by Intellectualism.
8.6  Conclusion
I have argued that “content”, conceived in terms of a correctness condi-
tion that can be the object of differing epistemic attitudes in and across 
persons, does not play an explanatorily significant role with respect to 
the constitution or generation of “intuition”—Kant’s term for the most 
primitive or basic kind of perceptual experience. I then argued that the 
debate concerning the content of experience be reconceived along the 
lines of the possession of cognitive abilities and the dependence relations 
that may or may not hold between intellectual and sensory abilities in 
the generation of intuition. The resulting framework for debate, between 
the positions I have labelled “Sensibilism” and “Intellectualism”, more 
fruitfully captures the central lines of contention that have implicitly or 
explicitly driven the conceptualism debate. I also presented several rea-
sons why Sensibilism may be a preferable interpretation of Kant, not 
least because it seems best suited to make sense of a central aspect of his 
Critical philosophy—namely, the modal contribution of sensibility, via 
acquaintance, to our cognition of reality.45
44 For a weaker reading of Kant’s position in this passage, see Chignell (2014). I agree with Chignell 
that demonstration of empirical possibility requires showing that an object or state of affairs is not 
ruled out by the formal conditions of experience plus the actual obtaining empirical laws. I also 
agree that in many cases such demonstration may be too demanding. But I do not see that as licens-
ing an interpretation according to which Kant is merely stating a kind of coherence condition with 
respect to background knowledge (Chignell 2014:591). By contrast, I concede that Kant may well 
be overstating his case against the possibility of telepathy, etc. However, all I need for my interpreta-
tion is that Kant appeals to something stronger than mere formal conditions of experience in 
determining real possibility, and that he construes experience’s contribution in many cases in terms 
of a presentation of actuality, rather than merely appealing to conditions of formal possibility. 
These points I take to be amply demonstrated by the relevant passages cited above from the 
Postulates.
45 Thanks to Anil Gomes, Stefanie Grüne, Dennis Schulting, Andrew Stephenson and an anony-
mous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions for clarification.
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